The world is in a state of "destructive disequilibrium", says UNTAD Secretary General, Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, Secretary-General  of UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), at the opening plenary of  the 57th session of the Trade and Development Board in Geneva. Offering a  completely different perspective on the global economic crisis and its  aftermath, the statement should be closely studied by the travel & tourism  industry as it ponders its future in the upcoming second decade of the 21st  century.The multiple challenges now  faced by the global community can perhaps be summed up in one word: imbalances.  Imbalances in food, energy, housing and financial markets were allowed to grow  during a sustained economic boom, becoming increasingly interdependent.
These  mounting imbalances generated a level of economic fragility which eventually  shattered with the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  But despite the massive  amount of public resources that have been mobilized to deal with the resulting  collapse, the underlying forces have been left untouched in the aftermath of the  crisis. They remain a toxic threat to stable and inclusive growth and the  sustainability of the recovery.
 Some emerging and developing  countries have demonstrated relative resilience to the impact of the crisis.  This is not just an accident; in several cases, it is the result of strategic  actions and policies on the part of governments. The use of reserve holdings and  massive economic stimulus packages, which in China's case amounted to 7% of GDP,  helped stave off a full-blown depression.  It also propelled the State back  into the driving seat of economic management, with industrial, macroeconomic and  selective trade policies helping to shore up against widespread market  collapse.
 The crisis has acted as a  watershed, revealing new economic powers and exposing weaker ones. It is now  clear, if ever there was any doubt, that in economic terms we are living in a  multi-polar world, with new and emerging sources of trade, investment, and even  aid. But there have also been other structural shifts in the past 10 years, most  significantly involving surplus and deficit countries and regions. The pattern  of global demand and output – in which US consumers accounted for roughly 16% of  world output, and developing-country savers provided the credit lines that  serviced US household debt – has proved deeply destabilizing and should not be  resumed.
 Replacing US demand cannot,  however, be left to China alone, as is often assumed, given that China's rate of  household consumption is in any case just one eighth that of the US. Moreover,  an increase in Chinese consumption is likely to favour domestically produced  goods and have less of an impact on imports. In such circumstances other surplus  nations, in particular Germany and Japan, may have to rebalance their economies  towards domestic consumption. This year's Trade and Development Report suggests  that wage increases – albeit consistent with productivity gains – would support  a move in that direction.
 Over the past 20 years real  wages have remained stagnant in many countries, including Germany, where  productivity gains have tended to provide greater returns to capital. In  developing countries, low wages have been the cornerstone of export-led growth,  providing countries such as China with a competitive advantage in globalized  markets and production chains. It is now time for countries such as China to  encourage wage increases, and there are clear signs that this is already  beginning to happen. UNCTAD believes that such pro-poor labour and wage policies  will have an impact on several kinds of imbalances, at both the domestic and  global levels.
 A reduction in savings and  the increase in wages – perhaps raising the price of exports – will also put an  end to the subsidization of developed-country debt. UNCTAD's conclusion in this  year's TDR is that wage increases and the provision of decent employment  opportunities for the developing world's burgeoning labour force are essential  for maintaining prosperity and avoiding a deflationary spiral.  
  Moreover, the large public  deficits are the result of governments responding to corporate and market  failure; banks and bondholders should now show patience with the unwinding of  the resulting sovereign debt. Certainly, the re-emergence of speculative  position-taking and the bonus culture in an industry that has perhaps become  even more oligopolistic since the collapse of Lehman Brothers et al. is a step  in the wrong direction.
  Elsewhere, imbalances in  areas such as food are also a source of serious concern for UNCTAD. On one hand,  the problem is highly visible: some countries are facing an obesity epidemic  even while they massively subsidize their agricultural sectors; others,  meanwhile, are suffering famine and food insecurity. Yet we seem unable to  comprehend the suffering of 1 in 6 of the world's population facing acute  hunger, let alone the potential political and social insecurity confronting  governments in those countries where household expenditure on food has risen to  nearly three quarters of household budgets. As we know from countless historical  precedents, not least the most recent in 2008, when people don't have enough  food to eat, governments become particularly vulnerable and social and political  instability ensue.
  A low level of fixed capital  investment in many developing countries is really a story for all sectors, where  productive capacity has sometimes atrophied due to under-capitalization in the  past 30 years. In agriculture, the picture for small farmers is particularly  bad, not least because of the strategic importance of food for the welfare of  citizens and for food security.
 In the past 20 years, food  and energy markets, and food and financial markets, have also become  increasingly interlinked. The deregulation of commodities trading in the 1990s  and the development of complex derivative products led to the increasing  financialization of commodities and the development of food as a new asset class  in its own right.
  In general, inequality  within, but also across, countries has been rising everywhere in the past 30  years, even as growth rates increased. In many cases, this has been associated  with distorted economic structures, including the premature disappearance of  industrial capacity. In Africa, by the end of the 1990s, the production  structure was reminiscent of the colonial period, consisting overwhelmingly of  agriculture and mining – that is, low value-added goods with decreasing returns  to scale. Despite increases in commodity prices, the terms of trade for primary  commodities today remain worse vis-à-vis manufactured goods and provide fewer  opportunities for productivity increases or employment.
 The economic crisis has  represented a further transfer of wealth, as private debt was exchanged for  public debt. Yet it is taxpayers and household savers – who cannot move their  money easily, and who have pensions that are not easily liquidated – who are  ultimately punished by having to finance corporate bailouts and endure  public-sector cuts. The ultra-mobile super-rich have so far been able to protect  their private affluence because of the inaction of governments and the G20 over  income tax avoidance, or damaging currency speculation, such as the so-called  "carry trade". It is time to close the tax havens and put a stop to the abuses  of the privileges of wealth. Needless to say, this needs to be done in a  coherent fashion to avoid arbitrage between tax jurisdictions, and the UN has  made proposals on this in its report on the financial and economic crisis.
 Over the past 10 years, the  world has slipped into an "age of asymmetry", of destructive disequilibrium.  This is a far cry from the promise of stable, sustainable and inclusive  development that multilateralists and the UN in particular have always tried to  promote. Almost everywhere one looks, one can see the pernicious effects of  imbalances: between the widening incomes of rich and poor; between surplus and  deficit countries; between agricultural subsidizers and food-insecure nations;  between investor-exporter economies and between consumer-debtor countries;  between market fundamentalism and the active intervention of the State, to  mention only a few.
 Perhaps the biggest elephant in the room is energy and  sustainable development. Our work already risks  overwhelming us, but we should not sacrifice our concern with long-term problems  for the immediate pressures of short-term crises.  Indeed, classifying the  climate problem into its short- and long-term dimensions is no longer really  appropriate; climate change and sustainable development should be at centre  stage in our reflections about current and future economic strategies.